Pictures of naked maine girls
The court noted that the indecent conduct statute's plain language does not “restrict or limit the manner in which [indecent conduct] can be committed.” The court thus found Legassie guilty of three counts of attempted sexual exploitation of a minor, one count of sexual exploitation of a minor, one count of attempted sexual abuse of a minor, and five counts of indecent conduct. The court found Legassie not guilty of the remaining counts charged in the indictment.[¶11] On March 24, 2016, the court sentenced Legassie to the following:• four years, all but nine months and one day suspended with three years of probation, on Count 27;• thirty days on Count 26, ninety days on Count 6, and thirty days on Count 12, to be served concurrently with each other and consecutive to the other sentences;• sixty days on Count 1, thirty days on Count 8, and thirty days on Count 9, to be served concurrently with each other and consecutively to Counts 26, 6, and 12;• sixty days on Count 2 and thirty days on Count 10, concurrent with each other and consecutive to the other sentences; and• thirty days on Count 11, to be served consecutively with the other sentences. Save your money, here it is for free.” The photo includes a watermark denoting it as a preview shot and has a message that says 14 additional photos would be made available if purchased. J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. Legassie James Mitchell, Assistant District Attorney (orally), Prosecutorial District 8, Caribou, for appellee State of Maine Reporter of Decisions[¶1] In this appeal, we address the intersection of the digital world of social media and our criminal statutes and rules of evidence.[¶2] The victims of the charges at issue here are five teenage girls, designated in the trial court's order as Victims A, B, C, D, and E. A computer printout of the Facebook messages exchanged between Legassie and Victim A was produced and admitted in evidence. Because different reasonable interpretations of the statute both do and do not cover Legassie's conduct, we conclude that the statute is ambiguous and thus look to legislative history and other extraneous aids to discern the Legislature's intent. Because we must construe section 854(1)(B) in the context of the entire statutory scheme, see Carr v. See Indecent Exposure, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2015) (“As a legal term of art, the best evidence rule requires that where the contents of a writing are desired to be proved, the writing itself must be produced or its absence sufficiently accounted for before other evidence of its contents can be admitted.” (quotation marks omitted)).[¶28] The best evidence rule applies not only to documents that are required to be in writing, such as a will, but also applies to acts with independent significance voluntarily performed in a writing—for example, when the claim or matter sought to be proved occurred solely in writing.
At that time, Legassie was twenty-one years old and Victim A was fifteen. In a public place:(1) The actor engages in a sexual act, as defined in section 251. 15, 26 n.8 (1973) (“[T]he States have greater power to regulate nonverbal, physical conduct than to suppress depictions or descriptions of the same behavior.”).[¶22] Ultimately, because we conclude that the statute does not apply to Legassie's conduct, it is unnecessary to speculate about the various ways in which an individual could commit the crime of indecent conduct. 1002, 1004(d) (stating that the rule does not apply where the writing “is not closely related to a controlling issue”). “Whether the content is at issue is determined on a case-by-case basis.” Lorraine v. (orally), Hardings Law Office, Presque Isle, for appellant Andrew J. Legassie asked Victim A for pictures of herself, asking her to put on a jersey “and have nothing else one [sic] and send me a pic” and “let me see them legss [sic] and behind.” Legassie later sent Victim A a picture of himself in his bedroom exposing his genitals. Legassie therefore contends that proof that he merely transmitted a digital photograph of himself to the victims in a Facebook message is legally insufficient to support the convictions.[¶16] Although “expose[ ]” and “see[ ]” could, construed very broadly, apply to Legassie's conduct, a narrower construction of those same terms could be interpreted to fall outside the scope of the statute. The Legislature neither expressly extended the statute to cover an exposure depicted in a photograph and later seen by the victim, nor specifically restricted its scope to an in-person exposure. 1994), and legislative intent relevant to the meaning of “expose [ ]” and “see[ ]” may be revealed by reference to the amendments to other subsections that contain the same terms, we consider the legislative history of section 854 as a whole.[¶17] Indecency statutes can be traced to the common law criminal offense of “public indecency.” See Barnes v. “Indecent exposure” has been defined specifically by reference to the public nature of the act. At the time of the alleged offenses, the victims ranged in age from fourteen to seventeen years old. 1002, requiring introduction of original writings, recordings or photographs, when available, requires the exclusion of the victims' testimony about digital messages that they received from the defendant.[¶4] Andrew J. [¶6] Legassie also added fifteen-year-old Victim B as a Facebook friend and sent her messages. 2014) (“An offensive display of one's body in public, esp.